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Abstract
Background: The spatial unity between self and body can be disrupted by employing conflicting visual-somatosensory
bodily input, thereby bringing neurological observations on bodily self-consciousness under scientific scrutiny. Here we
designed a novel paradigm linking the study of bodily self-consciousness to the spatial representation of visuo-tactile
stimuli by measuring crossmodal congruency effects (CCEs) for the full body.
Methodology/Principal Findings: We measured full body CCEs by attaching four vibrator-light pairs to the trunks (backs) of
subjects who viewed their bodies from behind via a camera and a head mounted display (HMD). Subjects made speeded
elevation (up/down) judgments of the tactile stimuli while ignoring light stimuli. To modulate self-identification for the seen
body subjects were stroked on their backs with a stick and the felt stroking was either synchronous or asynchronous with
the stroking that could be seen via the HMD. We found that (1) tactile stimuli were mislocalized towards the seen body (2)
CCEs were modulated systematically during visual-somatosensory conflict when subjects viewed their body but not when
they viewed a body-sized object, i.e. CCEs were larger during synchronous than during asynchronous stroking of the body
and (3) these changes in the mapping of tactile stimuli were induced in the same experimental condition in which
predictable changes in bodily self-consciousness occurred.
Conclusions/Significance: These data reveal that systematic alterations in the mapping of tactile stimuli occur in a full body
illusion and thus establish CCE magnitude as an online performance proxy for subjective changes in global bodily self-
consciousness.
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Introduction
The most basic foundations of the self arguably lie in those
complex brain systems that represent the body [1–5]. This has
been explored in research investigating multisensory and sensori-
motor bodily mechanisms and their relevance for conscious
aspects of processing related to body and self (or bodily self-
consciousness: [5–9]). An important line of research has studied
bodily self-consciousness by investigating the sense of ownership
for one’s hand [3,4,8,10–14]. These experiments manipulated the
sense of hand ownership by altering the congruence between
multimodal sources of hand-related signals. For example, in the
‘rubber hand illusion’ (RHI), a subject looks at a fake hand that is
being stroked by a paintbrush in synchrony with stroking applied
to his own (occluded) corresponding hand, positioned a small
distance away from the fake hand. Synchronous stroking of the
seen fake hand and one’s own unseen (real) hand can induce the
illusion that the fake hand ‘feels like it’s my hand’ (illusory
ownership or self-attribution [10,11,13]). In the RHI there is also a
mislocalization (or drift) of the subject’s hand towards the fake
hand. Importantly, illusory ownership and drift are much reduced
when the stroking is asynchronous [10,11,13,15].
Investigations of the RHI and related studies of the conscious
experience of hands and other body parts are very important, but in
addition, some authors argue that to achieve a full understanding of
bodily self-consciousness we must also investigate its global
character [5,16–18]. A fundamental aspect of bodily self-conscious-
ness is that the bodily self is experienced as a single and coherent
representation of the entire, spatially situated body, not as a
collection of several different body parts [5,16,19]. This is also
apparent in neurological observations. Although illusory ownership
in the RHI and somatoparaphrenia (when neurological patients
claim either that their arm belongs to another person or that
another person’s arm belongs to them [20,21]) exemplify deviant
forms of bodily self-consciousness, they affect body part ownership,
or the attribution and localization of a hand with respect to the
bodily self, i.e. they are characterised by part-to-whole relationships.
This can be contrasted with neurological patients who have illusory
perceptions of their full bodies such as in out-of-body experiences
and heautoscopy. These states are characterized by abnormal
experience with respect to the global bodily self, e.g. a mislocaliza-
tion and a misidentification of the entire body [22–24].
Recent studies [17,18,25–27] have further demonstrated that
global aspects of self-consciousness (self-location and self-identifi-
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cation for the full body) - which are disturbed in neurological
patients with autoscopic phenomena - can also be manipulated in
healthy individuals by generating multisensory conflicts. In one
study [18] subjects viewed their own body from behind via a head-
mounted display while their backs were stroked. When the ‘felt
stroking’ on the back of the body was congruent with the ‘seen
stroking’ on the ‘virtual’ body, subjects showed higher degrees of
ownership (or self-identification) for the virtual body, and
mislocalized their self to a position outside their bodily borders.
The studies on global bodily self-consciousness quantified
ownership by verbal or physiological responses [18,25,27], or
behavioural proxies such as perceived spatial ‘drift’ [18], based on
drift measures in the RHI [10]. However these measures do not
reveal whether modifications in global bodily self-consciousness
are associated with changes in tactile spatial representations.
Investigating this aspect is important, as it will reveal whether basic
sensory processing of bodily signals is involved in the representa-
tion of the bodily self. What is more, the supposed primacy of the
tactile sense in self-consciousness [28,29] generates the prediction
that whenever self-location is displaced, an associated change in
the mapping of tactile sensations should also occur.
Here we linked the study of global bodily self-consciousness with
the measurement of the spatial representation of visuo-tactile stimuli
by using the crossmodal congruency task [30]. We hypothesized
that this task could function - during the ‘full body illusion’ described
above - as an effective measure for probing global aspects of bodily
self-consciousness (global ownership and self-location) because the
crossmodal congruency effect (CCE) can function as a behavioural
index of whether visual and tactile stimuli are functionally perceived
to be at the same spatial location. In previous studies of the CCE
[12,30–33] the visual and tactile stimuli were presented on the
hands (a very recent study tested CCEs with stimuli on feet [34]).
Subjects performed worse when a distracting visual stimulus
occurred at an incongruent elevation with respect to the tactile
(target) stimulus. Importantly, the CCE (difference between
performance in incongruent and congruent conditions) was larger
when the visual and tactile stimuli occurred closer to each other in
space [30]. The CCE has previously been used as a measure of the
tactile mislocalisation of touch towards a rubber hand when a fake
hand was either aligned or misaligned with subjects’ own hands
([12], see also [15]). This measure has a number of advantages: its
magnitude is relatively large and it is less susceptible to experimenter
expectancy effects than previous behavioural proxies of bodily self-
consciousness. Moreover, the congruency task enables the collection
of repeated, ‘online’ measurements during manipulations of self-
consciousness: this has not previously been done in studies of partial
or global bodily self-consciousness.
In the present study we tested whether CCEs – studied so far
only for hands – would also be found when viewing one’s own
body from an external perspective, from two metres behind.
Firstly, we studied whether CCEs were modulated by the visual
presence or absence of the subject’s own body. Secondly, to
investigate whether these ‘full body CCEs’ could be associated in a
predictable way with changes in bodily self-consciousness, we kept
the visual stimulus constant and manipulated self-identification
with the virtual body and self-location by employing either
synchronous or asynchronous stroking of the back.
Methods
Subjects
A total of 35 healthy right-handed subjects took part: 13 (8
males, mean age 24 years) in study 1, 13 (9 males, mean age 26
years) in study 2, and 9 (6 males, mean age 23 years) in the object
control study (study 3). Two subjects were excluded from the
analyses of study 1 because of chance-level performance in some
conditions. Different subjects took part in studies 1, 2 and 3. All
subjects had no previous experience with the task or experimental
paradigms. All subjects had normal or corrected to normal vision
and had no history of neurological or psychiatric conditions.
Ethics Statement
All subjects gave written informed consent and were compen-
sated for their participation. The study protocol was approved by
the local ethics research committee – La Commission d’e´thique de
la recherche Clinique de la Faculte´ de Biologie et de Me´decine - at
the University of Lausanne, Switzerland and was performed in
accordance with the ethical standards laid down in the Declaration
of Helsinki.
Materials
We constructed four ‘light-vibration’ devices, each consisting of
a small vibrating motor (Precision MicroDrives shaftless vibration
motors, model 312–101, 3V, 60mA, 9000 rpm (150 Hz), 5 g)
paired with a single bright light emitting diode (LED; luminance
45 cd/m2). The motors had a surface area (the area touching the
skin) of 113 mm2 and reached maximal rotation speed in
approximately 50 ms. The devices were attached to the skin using
tape. The two ‘upper’ devices were positioned at the inner edges of
the shoulder blades and the two ‘lower’ devices 9 cm below (Fig. 1).
Subjects stood with their backs facing a 3D video camera placed 2
metres behind. The video was projected in real time (except for
asynchronous blocks, see below) onto a head mounted display
(HMD) enabling subjects to view the video in stereoscopic 3D.
White noise was presented over headphones to mask any noise
from the vibrators, and subjects wore a cloth hood over their heads
to occlude vision of their surroundings. The experiment took place
under artificial illumination except for the ‘body not visible’ block
when the room lights were switched off and the subjects stood in
darkness (but could still see the LEDs). During ‘stroking blocks’ the
backs (the area spanning the shoulders to waist) of subjects were
irregularly stroked, about twice per second by the experimenter
with a long wooden stick, and subjects could view the stroking via
the HMD. The stroking began one minute before the first
vibrotactile stimulus and continued throughout the entire block. In
asynchronous blocks a camera delay of 400 msec was introduced
(using a delaying device) so that ‘seen stroking’ and ‘felt stroking’
did not correspond.
Stimulus timings were controlled by a program written with E-
Prime software. Each trial consisted of a light (LED) flash followed
by a vibro-tactile stimulus. The active LED and active vibrating
motor were varied randomly and independently from trial to trial.
Each trial began with a light flash of 33 msec duration. In study 1,
vibro-tactile stimuli were presented 33 msec after the light onset,
and for a duration of 100 msec. Note that the vibrator only
reached full speed after 50 msec, thus the vibration onset was not
exactly at the SoA given. N.B. In studies 2 and 3 the parameters
were identical except that vibro-tactile stimuli were presented
233 msec after the light onset. After subjects had responded with a
button press there was a 1 second pause before the succeeding trial
commenced.
Procedure
The procedure was identical for all blocks except for those
details added below. Subjects were instructed to keep their eyes
open and fixate a location in the middle of their backs, as viewed
via the HMD. For the first minute of each block no vibrotactile or
LED stimuli were presented and subjects were instructed to stand
Keep in Touch with One’s Self
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Figure 1. Experimental set-up for different conditions. Subject stood two metres in front of a camera with a 3D-encoder. Four light-vibration
devices were fixed to the subject’s back, the upper two at the inner edges of the shoulder blades and the lower two 9 cm below. In the object control
conditions the lights were attached to a white rectangular metal panel. The small inset windows represent what the subject viewed via the head
mounted device. 1. (Upper row) left panel: ‘body visible’ condition; right panel: ‘body not visible’ condition. 2. (Middle row) left panel: synchronous
stroking condition; right panel: asynchronous stroking. 3. (Bottom row) - Object control – left panel: synchronous stroking; right panel: asynchronous
stroking.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006488.g001
Keep in Touch with One’s Self
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still and wait for the first stimulus. Subjects then had to signal with
their right hand, pressing one of two buttons as fast as possible,
whether they felt a vibration at the top (an upper device) or at the
bottom (a lower device) of their backs (regardless of side), while
trying to ignore the light flashes. These responses enabled us to
measure reaction times (RTs) and accuracies. At the end of the
block (of duration ,9 mins) global self-localization was measured
by first passively displacing the subjects (the experimenter gently
guided the subjects - who had their eyes closed - while they took
very small steps backwards). They were then asked to walk back to
their initial position (while keeping their eyes closed) with normal-
sized steps (as in [18]). The distance (the ‘drift’) between the
position held during the experimental block and the position
indicated by the subject was measured. Self-identification with the
seen body and other phenomenological aspects were assessed at
the end of each block by a questionnaire adapted from [18]; see
Table 1. Subjects took a short break before the subsequent block.
All subjects completed a training session (with the body visible and
no stroking) prior to the experimental blocks. In study 1 there were
30 trials per condition (same congruent, same side incongruent,
different side congruent and different side incongruent) and in
studies 2 and 3 there were 25 trials per condition. The order of
blocks was counterbalanced across subjects.
Study 1 experimental blocks: (1) Body visible (no stroking) (2)
Body not visible (no stroking) – lights in the room were turned off.
(3) Synchronous stroking blocks (4) Asynchronous stroking blocks.
See figure 1, top and middle panels.
Study 2: All stimulus and procedural details were as described
for study 1 except for an increased SOA (233 msec) between the
LED and vibro-tactile stimuli. Experimental blocks: (1) Synchro-
nous stroking blocks (2) Asynchronous stroking blocks (3) No
stroking blocks (same as ‘body visible’ block in study 1). See
figure 1, middle two panels.
Study 3 (object control): All stimulus and procedural details
were as described for the synchronous and asynchronous blocks in
study 2, except that in ‘synchronous object’ blocks, subjects’ backs
were stroked with the stick in synchrony with stroking viewed – via
the HMD – on a white upright rectangular human-sized metal
panel (the object; Fig. 1; bottom two panels). In the ‘asynchronous
object’ blocks the subjects’ backs were again stroked with the stick
but a delay was added to the visual display presented on the HMD
(as described in study 2) so that the ‘felt stroking’ was asynchronous
with respect to the seen stroking on the object. In the object blocks
the vibrators were attached to the backs of subjects, as described
previously, but the LEDs were attached to the object and were
placed at the same height from the ground and at the same relative
distances as the vibrators on the subjects’ backs.
Statistical analysis
Trials with incorrect responses and trials in which subjects failed
to respond within 1500 msec were discarded from the reaction
time (RT) analysis (following the method of [30]). As a result an
average of 4.8% of trials per subject were discarded. The mean
RTs and the drift (self-location) measures (calculated relative to
initial position = 0) were normally distributed (Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test for normality) and were analyzed using two-tailed
repeated measures analyses of variance (ANOVA) and two-tailed
t-tests, respectively. The questionnaire scores were analyzed using
a non-parametric test (Wilcoxon matched pairs test). The
significance (alpha) level used was 0.05.
For study 1, RT and accuracy data were analysed using a
repeated measures ANOVA with three factors: body (body visible/
not visible), side (same/different) and congruency (congruent/
incongruent). Mean RT and errors for all conditions are shown in
table 2. To examine the effect of stroking type, a separate repeated
measures ANOVA was run with factors stroking type (asynchro-
nous/synchronous), side (same/different) and congruency (con-
gruent/incongruent). For study 2 and study 3, RT and accuracy
data were again analysed using a repeated measures ANOVA with
the factors stroking type, side and congruency. We mainly focus on
the RT data rather than accuracy, as this has been shown to be
more sensitive [12,15,33].
Results
Results of Study 1
Figure 2 plots the size of the full body CCE (reaction time in
incongruent trials minus RT in congruent trials) for the body
visible and body not visible conditions. In the body visible
condition the CCE was larger when the light appeared on the
same side as the tactile stimulus, compared to when it appeared on
the different side. The ‘body not visible condition’ did not show
these effects on the size of the CCE. Statistical analysis revealed a
significant main effect of congruency (F1,10 = 15.25; p = 0.003), a
significant interaction between body and congruency
(F1,10 = 21.63; p = 0.001), a significant interaction between side
and congruency (F1,10 = 7.66; p= 0.02) and crucially, a significant
three-way interaction between body, side and congruency
(F1,10 = 10.13; p = 0.01). Planned comparisons between same
and different side CCEs for body visible and body not visible
conditions revealed that the CCE was significantly larger for the
same side compared to the different side visual presentation when
the body was visible (t1,10 = 3.22; p= 0.009) but not when the body
was not visible (t1,10 = 0.83; p.0.05). The error rates showed a
similar pattern of modulation by congruency and side. There was
Table 1. Self-identification Questionnaire.
During the experiment there were times when:
1 It seemed as if I was feeling the touch of the stick in the location where I saw the virtual body being touched
2 It seemed as though the touch I felt was caused by the stick touching the virtual body.
3 I felt as if the virtual body was my body.
4 It felt as if my (real) body was drifting towards the front (towards the virtual body).
5 It seemed as if I might have more than one body.
6 It seemed as if the touch I was feeling came from somewhere between my own body and the virtual body.
7 It appeared (visually) as if the virtual body was drifting backwards (towards my body).
8 It seemed as though I was in two places at the same time.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006488.t001
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a significant main effect of congruency (F1,10 = 8.36; p = 0.016) but
no other main effects or interactions. The congruency effect in
error rate when the body was visible was 8% for the same side and
3% for the different side. When the body was not visible the
congruency effect was 4% for same side and 2% for different side.
The difference in the size of the CCE for same and different side
light presentation was similar for synchronous and asynchronous
conditions (figure 3). Statistical analysis revealed a significant main
effect of congruency (F1,10 = 18.06; p= 0.002) and a significant
interaction between side and congruency (F1,10 = 8.82; p= 0.014).
No other effects reached significance (p.0.05), and there was no
significant three-way interaction between stroking, side and
congruency. The error rates again showed a similar pattern of
modulation by congruency and side. There was a significant main
effect of side (F1,10 = 30.83; p= 0.000); a significant main effect of
congruency (F1,10 = 39.3; p= 0.000) and a significant interaction
between side and congruency (F1,10 = 14.18; p= 0.004). No other
terms reached significance. The congruency effect in error rate for
synchronous stroking was 23% for the same side and 9% for the
different side. For asynchronous stroking the congruency effect was
20% for same side and 12% for different side. These error rates are
somewhat higher than those found in previous CCE studies and this
is probably due to two factors: applying the vibrations to the skin on
the back (which is less sensitive than the skin on the fingers) and
applying the stroking at the same time as the vibrations (which may
have made the task more difficult by introducing tactile ‘noise’).
No significant effects (p.0.05) of stroking type were found for
self-location – the size of the drift in self-location did not differ for
synchronous and asynchronous conditions. Further, there were no
Table 2. Mean reaction time and percentage of errors for
tactile targets in Studies 1–3 as a function of the visual
distractor with respect to the target, the distractor’s
congruence with the target and the experimental condition.
Target-distractor
congruence
Position of
distractor
Reaction Time
(ms)
Error
(%)
Study 1- Body Visible
Congruent same 528 (24) 4 (1)
different 575 (28) 7 (2)
Incongruent same 668 (40) 12 (4)
different 630 (27) 10 (3)
Study 1- Body Not visible
Congruent same 558 (33) 4 (2)
different 550 (38) 4 (1)
Incongruent same 577 (40) 8 (2)
different 570 (37) 6 (1)
Study 1- Body Synchronous
Congruent same 655 (44) 13 (3)
different 690 (49) 18 (3)
Incongruent same 773 (45) 36 (4)
different 760 (50) 27 (4)
Study 1- Body Asynchronous
Congruent same 698 (48) 17 (4)
different 746 (45) 13 (2)
Incongruent same 822 (34) 37 (8)
different 782 (35) 25 (3)
Study 2- Body Synchronous
Congruent same 543 (22) 12 (2)
different 627 (32) 19 (3)
Incongruent same 651 (31) 28 (5)
different 643 (33) 22 (3)
Study 2- Body Asynchronous
Congruent same 587 (34) 14 (2)
different 616 (30) 22 (2)
Incongruent same 636 (29) 31 (4)
different 634 (33) 24 (3)
Study 3 - Object Synchronous
Congruent same 646 (65) 13 (2)
different 669 (62) 16 (3)
Incongruent same 695 (58) 36 (12)
different 710 (55) 36 (9)
Study 3 - Object Asynchronous
Congruent same 698 (56) 11 (2)
different 655 (53) 10 (3)
Incongruent same 690 (46) 33 (12)
different 701 (61) 33 (10)
Study 3 - Body Synchronous
Congruent same 615 (50) 8 (3)
different 674 (44) 11 (2)
Incongruent same 795 (49) 39 (10)
different 726 (31) 41 (9)
Study 3 - Body Asynchronous
Congruent same 698 (33) 6 (2)
Target-distractor
congruence
Position of
distractor
Reaction Time
(ms)
Error
(%)
different 749 (44) 14 (3)
Incongruent same 765 (28) 37 (9)
different 800 (51) 31 (6)
Standard errors are in parentheses.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006488.t002
Table 2. Cont.
Figure 2. CCE in study 1 – ‘body visible’ and ‘body not visible’
conditions. Mean congruency effects in reaction time (RT) in
milliseconds (RT in incongruent trials minus RT in congruent trials) in
Study 1 for ‘body visible’ and ‘body not visible’ conditions. Error bars
show standard errors of the mean.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006488.g002
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significant differences in the questionnaire ratings (see table 1 for
list of questions) between these conditions.
As predicted, we found that the CCE is present for the full body,
and is larger when subjects see their body (as compared to when
they do not see their body). Our second prediction was not
confirmed: stroking (synchronous versus asynchronous) neither
modulated the CCE, nor did it modify self-location or self-
identification. The lack of a stroking effect on self-location and
self-identification (question 3) is, at first sight, at odds with the
findings of a previous study [18] that found a significant increase in
both measures during synchronous stroking. This may have been
because in the present set-up we added a second visuo-tactile
mismatch (LED versus vibration) to the visuo-tactile mismatch
already present due to stroking, thus the stimuli in the congruency
task may have interfered with mechanisms related to self-location
and self-identification. In particular, our stroking conditions may
have been ‘more synchronous’ (or ‘less asynchronous’) as a result of
the introduction of the short interval LED-vibro-tactile stimuli. A
complex range of temporal, spatial (and cognitive) factors
determines the weighting of each unisensory input during
multisensory integration [35–37]. It is therefore possible that the
particular combination of visual and tactile signals that were present
in the experimental conditions in study 1 may have affected the
visuo-tactile integration involved in the computation of self-location.
The stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) of 33 msec in study 1 was
chosen based on previous studies on CCEs [30,33] which reported
maximal CCEs for an SOA of ,30–100 msec. It may be that
processes related to visuo-tactile integration during the combined
presentation of the LED/vibro-tactile stimuli and the seen/felt
stroking were different to the visuo-tactile integration that occurs
when the LED/vibro-tactile stimuli are presented alone.
We therefore ran a second study with a different (increased) SOA
between the LED and vibro-tactile stimuli. In order to maximise
temporal asynchrony between these stimuli, but potentially retain a
CCE, we chose an SOA of 233 msec based on results showing that
the CCE is still present for SOAs of ,200 msec [33]. Stimuli were
presented in three different experimental blocks – synchronous,
asynchronous and no stroking blocks - as in study 1.
Results of Study 2
With an SOA of 233 msec, we found that the type of stroking
modulates the CCE. In the synchronous condition the CCE was
larger when the light appeared on the same side as the tactile
stimulus compared to when it appeared on the different side,
whereas the CCE during asynchronous stroking did not differ for
same and different side light presentations (see figure 4). The
ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of side (F1,12 = 9.10;
p = 0.011), congruency (F1,12 = 15.80; p = 0.002), a significant
interaction between side and congruency (F1,12 = 13.40;
p = 0.003), and crucially, a significant three-way interaction
between stroking type, side and congruency (F1,12 = 11.30;
p = 0.006). Planned comparisons between same and different side
CCEs for synchronous and asynchronous conditions revealed that
the CCE was significantly larger for the same side than different
side in the synchronous condition (t1,12 = 4.01; p = 0.002), but not
in the asynchronous condition (t1,12 = 2.17; p.0.05). The error
rates showed a similar pattern of modulation by congruency and
side. There was a significant main effect of congruency
(F1,12 = 21.69; p= 0.001) and a significant interaction between
side and congruency (F1,12 = 60.46; p= 0.000). There were no
other significant main effects or interactions. The congruency
effect in error rate for synchronous stroking was 16% for same side
and 3% for different side. For asynchronous stroking the
congruency effect was 18% for same side and 3% for different side.
In the synchronous condition the subjects showed a mean drift
in self-location of 8.1 cm towards the virtual body, whereas in the
asynchronous condition the mean drift was 0.1 cm (Figure 5). The
size of the drift in the synchronous condition was significantly
different from the drift in the asynchronous condition (t1,12 = 2.21;
p = 0.047; two-tailed t-test). For the questionnaire data, statistical
analysis revealed significant differences between the synchronous
and asynchronous conditions only for questions 1 and 3.
Participants gave a significantly higher positive rating in the
synchronous condition compared to the asynchronous condition
for question 1 (‘‘It seemed as if I was feeling the touch of the stick
in the location where I saw the virtual body being touched’’)
evaluating touch (z = 2.8; p= 0.005) and for question 3 (‘‘I felt as if
the virtual body was my body‘‘) evaluating self-identification
(z = 2.3; p= 0.020), see Table 1 and Figure 5.
Study 2 revealed that the CCE differs between synchronous and
asynchronous stroking, and study 1 showed that CCEs are found
when the LEDs are presented on a body but not when the body is
not visible. Study 3 was carried out to further understand these
effects. In order to determine whether the modulating effect of
Figure 3. CCE in study 1 – synchronous and asynchronous
stroking conditions. Mean congruency effects in reaction time in
milliseconds (RT in incongruent trials minus RT in congruent trials) in
Study 1 for synchronous and asynchronous conditions.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006488.g003
Figure 4. CCE in study 2 – synchronous and asynchronous
stroking conditions. Mean congruency effects in reaction time in
milliseconds (RT in incongruent trials minus RT in congruent trials) in
Study 2 for synchronous and asynchronous conditions. Error bars show
standard errors of the mean.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006488.g004
Keep in Touch with One’s Self
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stroking is specific to the case where a human body is viewed or
could also be found when an inanimate object is stroked, we ran a
final control experiment with nine subjects who viewed (via the
HMD) synchronous and asynchronous stroking on an object or on
their body while stroking was applied to their backs, as before.
Results of Study 3
Figure 6 plots the size of the CCE for same and different sides
for synchronous and asynchronous stroking for the object control
condition. For the object condition there was no difference in the
size of the CCE for same side versus different side visual
presentation during either synchronous stroking or asynchronous
stroking. The ANOVA did not reveal any significant main effects:
stroking type (F1, 8 = 0.04, p = 0.846); side (F1, 8 = 0.01, p = 0.921);
congruency (F1, 8 = 4.43, p = 0.068), or any significant interactions:
stroking type6side (F1, 8 = 1.57, p= 0.246); stroking type6con-
gruency (F1, 8 = 0.60, p = 0.460); side6congruency (F1, 8 = 0.452,
p = 0.520); stroking type6side6congruency (F1, 8 = 1.17,
p = 0.311). We replicated the previous result for the ‘body’
condition in this new sample of subjects, i.e. the effects confirmed
those of study 2: during synchronous stroking the CCE was
significantly larger when the light appeared on the same side as the
tactile stimulus compared to when it appeared on the different side
(t1,8 = 2.60; p = 0.031), whereas the CCE during asynchronous
stroking did not differ for same and different side light presentation
(t1,8 = 0.39; p.0.05).
Analysis of the error rates for the object control showed that
error rates were lower for the asynchronous condition than the
synchronous condition: there was a significant main effect of
stroking type (F1, 8 = 5.61, p = 0.045). There were no other
significant main effects: side (F1, 8 = 0.179, p = 0.683); congruency
(F1, 8 = 5.14, p = 0.053), and no significant interactions: stroking
type6side (F1, 8 = 0.278, p = 0.612); stroking type6congruency
(F1, 8 = 0.037, p = 0.852); side6congruency (F1, 8 = 0.026,
p = 0.876); stroking type6side6congruency (F1, 8 = 0.163,
p = 0.697).
There was no significant difference in the mean drift between
the synchronous object and asynchronous object conditions
(t1,8 = 0.41; p.0.05). For the questionnaire data, there was a
significant difference between ratings of the self-identification
question (‘‘I felt as if the object was my body‘‘) for the synchronous
and asynchronous object blocks (z = 2.20; p = 0.03), however the
ratings were barely, or not even positive (4.1 for synchronous and
2.9 for synchronous on a scale where rating 4 is neither positive
nor negative, i.e. ‘zero’).
Discussion
Linking the study of the spatial representation of visuo-tactile cues
with manipulations of bodily self-consciousness, we report three
principal findings. First, we show that crossmodal congruency
effects are stronger when visual distractors are presented on one’s
seen body compared to when they are presented in the dark.
Second, full body CCEs are larger during synchronous stroking
than during asynchronous stroking of one’s back, and depend on the
temporal delay between the vibro-tactile and LED stimuli. Note
that this effect of stroking on the CCE is not found when the LEDs
and the stroking are viewed on a human-sized object instead of the
body. Third, both full body CCEs and measures of bodily self-
consciousness are modulated by visuo-tactile stimulation (type of
stroking): In the synchronous stroking condition CCEs are larger,
Figure 5. Drift and questionnaire scores in study 2. 1. (Left inset) Drift measured in cm for synchronous and asynchronous conditions on the
posterior-anterior axis (Study 2). 2. (Right inset) Score on the ‘‘self-identification questionnaire’’ (Study 2) as adapted from [10].
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006488.g005
Figure 6. CCE in study 3 – Object control. Mean congruency
effects in reaction time in milliseconds (RT in incongruent trials minus
RT in congruent trials) in the object control study (Study 3) for
synchronous and asynchronous conditions.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006488.g006
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the drift towards the seen body is greater and the questionnaire
ratings of self- identification with the seen body are higher
compared to in the asynchronous condition. These novel data
reveal ‘body-related’ and ‘self-related’ CCEs and suggest that under
the conditions used in the present study the full body CCE is
associated with key components of bodily self-consciousness, i.e.
‘what I experience as my body’ and ‘where I experience my body to
be.’
By demonstrating CCEs for the full body our data extend the
findings of previous studies that have used this paradigm for body
parts, usually hands [12,15,30–32]. In the present study, the CCEs
were larger when the visual distractors appeared on the same side
(e.g. right side) of the body as the vibro-tactile targets than when
the distractors appeared on the other body side (e.g. left side). This
demonstrates that even for the full body, the magnitude of the
CCE is modulated by the perceived spatial distance between the
tactile target and the visual distractor (as previously observed for
hand CCEs [12,15,30,32]). Such effects were absent when the
stimulus display did not show the subject’s body, and when an
object was viewed in the place of the body, even though the visual
stimuli (LEDs) were still visible and in the same spatial
configuration. It is notable that the full body CCEs were observed
even though subjects had an external, implausible, view of their
body (they viewed the back of their body, which cannot be directly
seen), standing two metres in front.
Our findings are also compatible with data reporting visual
capture of touch when lights were presented on fake hands
[12,15]. CCEs have also been measured for shadows of hands [32]
and even for photographs of hands presented via video monitors
[31]. More generally, this is consistent with studies [7,38–43]
demonstrating how the sight of one’s own body parts can influence
tactile perception, in some cases even with views of body parts (e.g.
the neck) that cannot be directly seen [42,43].
A second major finding of the present study is that, as predicted,
the CCE was larger during synchronous than asynchronous
stroking (study 2). Modifying visual-somatosensory congruence by
employing different types of stroking enabled us to manipulate
whether or not subjects felt as if they were looking at their own body,
as indicated by the questionnaire data (see below). The CCE was
only modulated by stroking when we introduced a larger temporal
asynchrony between the LED and vibro-tactile stimuli. It is well
known that multisensory integration is strongly influenced by the
temporal relations between stimuli [33,35–37]. Our experiment
incorporated two ongoing visuo-tactile ‘events’: the seen and felt
stroking, and the combined LED-vibro-tactile stimuli. We argue
that when the LED-vibro-tactile stimuli were made more
asynchronous (by introducing the larger SOA), this may have
influenced the differential weighting of all visual and tactile stimuli
present, and therefore have affected how the felt stroking and seen
stroking were integrated. Alternatively, it is also possible that in
study 1 when the SOAwas smaller, i.e. when the LED and vibration
signals were more synchronous, this interfered with the stroking by
rendering the asynchronous condition ‘less asynchronous’.
Our third major finding is that both full body CCEs and
measures of bodily self-consciousness are modulated by visuo-
tactile stimulation (type of stroking). During the synchronous
condition there was (1) a larger CCE, (2) a greater degree of self-
identification (as shown by Q3 in the questionnaire data) and (3) a
larger drift in self-location towards the virtual body (as shown by
the drift measure) compared to the asynchronous condition. This
suggests that a greater degree of visual capture of tactile location
occurs in the experimental condition in which there is a greater
degree of self-identification for the seen body.
The present data suggest that the tactile stimuli are mislocalised
to a different place in external space (towards the seen body in the
synchronous condition) because the localisation of the body in
space is biased towards the seen body (as measured by the drift and
questionnaire) in the condition in which the CCEs are larger. In
the synchronous condition it is not merely that the CCE is larger
than in the asynchronous condition: there is also a greater
difference between the same side and different side CCEs in the
former condition. This side effect is likely to be a due to a change
in the spatial perceptual representations because if the touch is
represented as being closer in space to where the body (and LEDs)
are seen then we would expect the difference between same and
different side CCEs to be larger. This is because when the virtual
body and the real body are perceived as being closer the distance
between a given tactile stimulus and a different side visual distractor
is greater than that between a tactile stimulus and a same side
distractor.
It should be noted that visual capture of touch is not the only
possible explanation for the increased CCE. Alternative explana-
tions for differences in CCE magnitude have been discussed in
depth by Spence and colleagues [44]. One possibility is that seeing
the visual stimuli on the body increases their task relevance. While
this could explain the results of study 1 where we compare CCEs
when the body was or was not seen, it is not clear how effects of
task relevance could account for the results obtained in study 2
(where we found that the different types of stroking modulated
CCEs differently). Response bias – where, e.g. incongruent ‘up’
stimuli prime the ‘up response’ - is another factor thought to
contribute to CCE magnitude [30,33,44] - but it cannot explain
the differential side effects found in all three studies. An interesting
alternative explanation is that the difference in CCEs is not due to
tactile recoding but to visual recoding. It could be that seeing the
visual stimuli on the body causes these distant visual stimuli to be
recoded so that they are made equivalent to near visual stimuli in
their effects [44,45]. This could explain the results of study 1, as
the sight of one’s body could cause the recoding of the visual
stimuli so that they are represented as being closer to the tactile
stimuli. One might also argue that in study 2, the synchronous
stroking increased this visual recoding effect (compared to
asynchronous stroking) or otherwise the asynchronous stroking
decreased it. The difference in CCEs we report can only show that
tactile and spatial stimuli are perceived as being closer to each
other (in the synchronous condition) – this finding cannot by itself
show whether it is touch or vision that is remapped. Nevertheless,
given that there is a change in self-location - as measured by the
spatial drift - towards the seen body (i.e. towards the visual
stimulus) in the synchronous condition, we suggest that it is touch
rather than vision that is mislocalised.
The self-related aspects of the CCE appear to be not simply an
effect of seeing a body, but of identifying with the seen body, and
having an altered self-location (biased towards the spatial location
at which the body is seen). This is further evidence for the
predicted [28,29] strong association between self-consciousness
and the tactile sense. These findings are unlikely to be due to a
difference in the level of attention between the conditions, since
stimulus-based differences were minimized between the synchro-
nous and asynchronous stroking conditions. Further, our finding
that there was no CCE (no significant effect of congruency and no
interaction between synchrony, side of visual distractor and
congruency) in the object control condition suggests that the effect
of stroking on the CCE is specific to the case where the stroking is
applied to a human body.
The congruency task we employed has several advantages for
use in studies of bodily self-consciousness: firstly, it is an online
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measure of self-location and hence can be measured during full
body illusions. This task is thus arguably an improvement on
methods used both in previous studies of partial (body part)
ownership [10,11,13] and studies of global ownership/self-
identification [18,25], since these measured behavioural/physio-
logical proxies of bodily self-consciousness after the stroking period.
Moreover, the magnitude of the CCE is relatively large, and
multiple repeated measures can be obtained; this was not the case
during most previous manipulations (although note that repeated
CCE measures were collected in studies of the ‘fake hand effect’
[12,15]). Performance in the congruency task is also likely to be
much less susceptible to observer biases that may have affected
self-location and questionnaire measures in previous studies
[18,25]. The present CCE task is relatively simple, involving only
speeded, forced choice, perceptual judgements - no high level
introspective reflections (as questionnaires require) - and is thus
suitable for use in patient studies and even in animal studies.
Pavani and colleagues [12] used the CCE to investigate tactile
spatial perception when vibrations were applied to subjects’ hands,
and lights (LEDs) were presented on rubber hands. In this study,
the CCE was present only when the rubber hands had the same
posture as the real hands, and in this case subjects were more likely
to report feeling the touch at the location of the rubber hands (see
also [15]). Despite the importance of these earlier CCE studies
[12,15], we argue that they have certain limitations in terms of
investigating bodily self-consciousness. Firstly, these studies did not
directly manipulate self-attribution (e.g. by stroking) during the
CCE measurements, but only after. Secondly, these (and other
[10–13,32,40]) authors concentrated on the investigation of the
representation of body parts, but did not manipulate aspects
related to global bodily self-consciousness such as self-location and
self-identification of the full body [16]. These global aspects are
altered in the full body illusion [17,18,25,27] and in autoscopic
phenomena (see, e.g. [22–24,46]. During heautoscopy, patients see
a second own (illusory) body in extrapersonal space and self-
location is either experienced at the position of the physical body
or at the position of the illusory body, or at both. Moreover, self-
location may change the experienced position (between the
position of the illusory and the physical body) and this may occur
in rapid alternation [22,23]. Patients self-identify either with the
illusory body, the physical body, or with both in alternation
[22,47,48]. Altered self-location and self-identification with an
illusory body at an extracorporeal position are strongly present in
OBEs: the self is experienced as localized outside one’s bodily
borders (disembodiment). In OBEs, self-location is never at the
position of the physical body. The present data show that the
previously described [17,18,25,27] changes in self-location and
self-identification are - under certain experimental conditions -
associated with changes in the CCE, and hence with changes in
the mapping of tactile stimuli.
Since stimuli were applied only to the backs of the subjects in
the present study it is possible that non-stimulated body parts were
not affected by the stroking manipulation and thus that the
measured effects were not global. However, as argued elsewhere
[16], we believe that the present experimental manipulations did
enable us to investigate global/full-body representations. Firstly,
CCEs were associated with changes in self-identification (and thus
more global changes than changes in self-attribution measured in
the RHI). Secondly, the CCEs were larger in the condition
(synchronous condition) in which the change in self-location was
greater. Interference with more global aspects of bodily processing
is also likely given back (trunk) stroking because tactile receptive
field properties differ substantially between neurons encoding the
trunk (large and bilateral receptive fields) and those encoding
hands or feet (small and unilateral receptive fields) [49,50]. It
would be interesting and important for future studies to investigate
- in detailed follow up experiments - whether the effects of stroking
applied on the trunk (as done here) generalizes to non-stimulated
body parts, e.g. the hands.
In conclusion, the present data reveal full body-related CCEs,
and ‘self-related’ CCEs, the latter demonstrating that the
magnitude of the CCE is associated with ‘what I experience as
my body’ and ‘where I experience my body to be’. The
experimental manipulation of self-identification (via stroking)
combined with the measurement of self-location estimates (CCEs)
enabled us to characterize bodily self-consciousness in terms of
underlying multisensory mechanisms, thereby extending recent
data [17,18,25,27] on global bodily self-consciousness. The present
study reveals that systematic alterations in the mapping of tactile
stimuli occur in the full body illusion, and thus establishes CCE
magnitude as an online performance proxy for subjective changes
in bodily self-consciousness.
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